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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

RDG ASSOCIATES/JORMAN
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

Case No. 86-0003

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendant-Appellant.
00O00

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In its effort to impose liability on respondent, RDG
Associates/Jorman Corporation

("RDG") for the payment of

wages earned by employees of RDG's building contractor, T&K
Steel, Inc. ("T&K"), appellant, The Industrial Commission of
Utah (the "Commission"), has committed a monumental error:
it has elected to premise liability under § 34-28-8 of the
Utah Wage Payment Statute (§ 34-28-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann.
(1953)) rather than the Utah Bonding Statute contained in §§
14-2-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953).

In proceeding in

that manner, the Commission has either ignored or overlooked
the only statutory basis even arguably imposing liability on
RDG for payment of wages earned by T&K's employees. Because
the

Utah

Bonding

Statute

specifically

prescribes

the

circumstances under which a landowner such as RDG is liable
for the payment of wages earned

in connection with the

conferring of improvements upon the landowner's property,
the Commission's
requires

failure

affirmance

of

to proceed
the

under

District

that

Court's

statute

order

of

dismissal.
While the Utah Wage Payment Statute unquestionably is
designed to protect wage earners from the risk of nonpayment
of wages under certain circumstances, it does not, as the
Commission suggests, make a landowner (or any other obligor)
an absolute guarantor for the payment of wages. A review of
the predecessor provisions of the Utah Wage Payment Statute
and case law from other jurisdictions interpreting similar
statutes and a recognition of the policies and purposes
underlying the Utah Wage Payment Statute establishes that
the legislature never intended to make contracting parties
an

insurer

intended

of

only

unpaid

wages.

to prevent

liability

for

employees

by

the payment
contracting

Rather,

parties
of
that

from

wages
work

the

seeking

owed
out

legislature

to

to

to avoid
their

own

"independent

contractors" rather than employing such persons directly.
Basic

rules

of

statutory

construction

and

common

sense

interpretation militate against any conclusion that the Utah

2

Wage

Payment

Statute

extends

unqualifiedly

to

impose

absolute liability on contracting parties for unpaid wages.
The District Court's interpretation of the Utah Wage
Payment

Statute, as embodied

in its order

granting

the

Owner's motion for summary judgment dated November 18, 1985
(the

"Summary

Judgment

Order")

should,

accordingly,

be

affirmed,
ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Determined
That RDG Was Not Liable For
The Payment Of Wages Earned By Employees
Of Its Contractor
A.

The Utah Wage Payment Statute Was Intended To Impose
Liability For Payment Of Wages Only On Parties Who
Contracted Their Work Out To "Independent Contractors"
Rather Than Employing Such Persons Directly.
There is no question that § 34-28-8 of the Utah Wage

Payment Statute is designed to protect wage earners from the
nonpayment

of

wages

under

certain

circumstances.

Unfortunately, this is a case of first impression in the
State of Utah and there are no cases defining the precise
circumstances

under

which wage earners are entitled to its

3

protective

provisions.

In

the

District

Court,

the

Commission asserted that the purpose of the statute was to
give employees of a "subcontractor" who are not paid for
their labor a remedy against the principal who ultimately
benefits from the employees' efforts, even though as here,
the

principal

contractor.

(RDG)

paid

all

amounts

due

to

the

Consequently, the Commission took the position

that the statute contains absolutely no limitations, and
imposes liability for unpaid wages on anyone who enters into
a contract for the performance of work.
A review of prior legislative enactments of the Utah
Wage Statute and case law from another jurisdiction with a
similar

statute

clearly

demonstrates

that

the

Utah

legislature did not intend to make contracting parties an
absolute insurer of unpaid wages.

Rather, the legislature

In general terms, the Utah Wage Payment Statute
requires employers to make timely and regular payment
of wages to their employees, to give notices of their
rate and date of payment, to settle wages due promptly
upon voluntary or involuntary severance and to keep
specified payroll records. As this court has observed,
the statute is ", . . apparently aimed at helping those
whose employment contracts are silent on its subject
matter."
Action Electric Company v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 636 P.2d 474, 475 (Utah 1981).
Thus, it would appear that only where it is
demonstrated that a contracting party has failed to
comply with those requirements can it be required to
pay the wages of its subcontractor's employees.
4

Intended to prevent parties from avoiding certain statutory
obligations/ including the payment of wages, which they owe
to their own employees, by contracting such work out to
"independent contractors" rather than employing such persons
directly.
In 1937/ the Utah legislature enacted the predecessor
to the Utah Wage Payment Statute.

This predecessor statute

was codified as § 34-10-9/ Utah Code Ann. and provided as
follows:
"(a) Whenever an employer shall contract with
another (herein called the subcontractor) for
the performance of the employer's worky then
it shall be the duty of such employer to
provide in such contract that the employees
of the subcontractor shall be paid according
to the provisions of this act; and in the
event that such subcontractor shall fail to
pay wages to these employees as specified In
this act/ such employer shall become civilly
liable to the employees of the subcontractor
to the extent that such work is performed
under such contract in the same manner as if
said employees were directly employed by such
employer.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this
section shall likewise be deemed applicable
to any personf firm/ partnership/ association
or corporation who not being an employer/ and
hereinafter referred 1 to in this act as an
'indirect
employer/
contracts
with
a
subcontractor for the performance of his
work,." (Emphasis added).
In 1941/ § 34-10-9 was amended to read as follows:
"Whenever any person shall contract with
another for the performance of work then it
shall be the duty of such person to provide
5

in such contract that all wages earned
pursuant to such contract shall be paid in
accordance with the provisions of this act,
and in the event that any wages earned under
such contract shall not be paid as required
in this act, such person shall be civilly
liable for all wages for work performed under
such contract in the same manner as if the
employees entitled
to such wages were
directly employed by such person," (Emphasis
added).
On its face, it is apparent that the 1941 amendment rewrote
paragraph

(a) of the 1939 statute to eliminate the term

"employer" and deleted subparagraph

(b) (the definitional

section of employer) in its entirety.

Finally, in 1966, the

Utah legislature repealed the entire chapter (Chapter 10)
entitled Payment of Wages and recodified it in Chapter 28
with no change other than the reference to "chapter" as
opposed to "act."

No other amendments to the Utah Wage

Payment Statute have been made.
As noted above, there is no judicial guidance as to the
applicability of the former or present Utah Wrage Payment
Statute or the purpose of the 1941 amendment.
statute, however, is not unique

This type of

to the State of Utah.

Kansas, for example, has an almost identical statute which
provides as follows:
"Whenever any such corporation shall contract
any or all of its work to any contractor,
then it shall become a duty of such
corporation to provide that the employees of
such corporation or contractor shall be paid
according to the provisions of this act, and
6

such corporation shall become responsible and
liable to the employees of such contractor in
the same manner as if said employees were
employed by such corporation,"
(Emphasis
added). KSA § 44-306.
In McGown v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 529 P.2d 97
(Kan. 1974), the Supreme Court of Kansas went

to great

lengths to explain the purposes and applicability of the
foregoing provision (the "Kansas Wage Statute").

In McGown,

the defendant telephone company entered into a contract with
D&M Cable Company ("D&M") wherein D&M agreed to install an
underground telephone cable for the defendant.

The contract

was terminated prior to the completion of the contract and
the plaintiffs (who were employees of D&M) brought an action
against the defendant telephone company for the payment of
unpaid wages.
The issue in McGown was whether the installation of
underground

cable was

"work" of the defendant

company so as to make it liable under
Statute.

telephone

the Kansas Wage

Since there was no Kansas case law defining the

term "its work," the Kansas court was required to review the
entire

Kansas

protection

of

statutory
laborers

scheme
to

with

determine

applicability of the Kansas Wage Statute.
the

court

focused

on

respect
the

to

the

purpose

and

In that review,

the Kansas workmen's

compensation

statute which imposed liability on persons for injuries and

7

lost wages suffered by direct employees or by the employees
of a subcontractor with whom such person had contracted for
the performance of work which was part of such person's
"trade or business."

As noted by the Kansas court, the

purpose of the "trade or business" provision in the Kansas
workmen's compensation statute was to prevent persons from
avoiding the liability imposed therein by contracting away
work

which

claiming

was

that

employee.

part
the

of

their

injured

"trade or

person

was

business" and
not

a

direct

Since there was and is no logical distinction

between "unpaid wages" on the one hand, and "injuries and
lost wages" on the other, the court in McGown determined
that the purpose of the Kansas Wage Statute and the Kansas
workmen's compensation statute was precisely the same:
prevent

a

corporation

from

evading

statutory

to

liability

enacted to protect employees from contracting away its work
to so-called independent contractors.
After determining that the purpose of the two statutes
was identical, the court in McGown found that the "trade or
business"

cases

decided

under

the

Kansas

workmen's

compensation statute were applicable to define the term "its
work" under the Kansas Wage Statute.

Since under those

cases the installation of underground cable was clearly part
of the defendant telephone company's "trade or business,"

3

liability for unpaid wages under the Kansas Wage Statute was
imposed•
The Utah Wage Payment Statute at issue in this case is
virtually

identical

to

Kansas1.

Moreover,

the

Utah

workmen's compensation statute (§§ 35-1-1 et seq., (1953)),
also

is designed

to prevent a person

from evading

the

liability imposed therein by contracting away work within
its "trade or business."

Following the rationale set forth

in McGown, this court should refer to the Utah statutory
schemef

particularly

the

Utah

workmen's

compensation

statute/ to determine the purpose and applicability of the
Utah Wage Payment Statute.
In this casef RDGf as an owner of property, entered
into a contract with T&K wherein T&K agreed to construct
condominiums on RDG's property.

Under Utah lawf RDGf by

this contract/ did not contract away work which was part of
its "trade or business." In the words of the District Court,
it was "not regularly engaged in the construction business."
(R. 97, 98). Therefore, under a long line of Utah workmen's
compensation cases holding that the making of a contract for
the construction of a building by one who is not engaged in
the construction business does not constitute the conducting
of a "trade or business"/ RDG's delegation of work to T&K
does not amount to the contracting away of its work. See,

9

e.g. , Lee v. Chevron Oil Co., 565 P.2d 1128 (Utah 1977).
Thus, under the rationale of McGown and by analogy to the
Utah workmen's compensation statute, RDG is not liable for
the wages T&K failed to pay its employees.
Court

correctly

applied

that

rationale

and

The District
analogy

in

entering the Summary Judgment Order.

B,

Only The Specific Utah Bonding Statute And Not The
General Utah Wage Payment Statute Can Be Used To Impose
Liability On A Landowner For Unpaid Wages Earned By
Employees Of The Landowner's Contractor.
Beginning

in

1915,

the

Utah

Legislature

enacted

specific legislation for the protection of laborers whose
efforts conferred a benefit on the owner of an interest in
land.

That legislation, which evolved through amendments in

1917, 1933, 1943 and 1977, is now embodied in § 14-2-1, Utah
Code Ann. (1953 as amended). That section now provides that:
"The owner of any interest in land entering into a
contract, involving $2,000 or more, for the
construction, addition to, alteration, or repair
of, any building, structure, or improvement upon
land shall, before any such work is commenced,
obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal
to the contract price, with good and sufficient
sureties, condition for the faithful performance
of the contract and prompt payment for material
furnished, equipment and materials rented, and
labor performed under the contract."
(Emphasis
added).
Section 14-2-2 of the Utah Bonding Statute provides that any
person who fails to obtain such a bond, " . . . shall be

10

personally

liable

to

all

persons

who

have

furnished

materials or performed labor under the contract . . . ."
The Commission elected not to proceed under the Utah
Bonding Statute.

Rather, it sought to impose liability

against the Owner under § 34-28-8 of the Utah Wage Payment
Statute which provides:
"Subcontractors — Compliance with act.
— Whenever any person shall contract with
another for the performance of work, then it
shall be the duty of such person to provide
in the contract that all wages earned
pursuant to the contract shall be paid in
accordance with the provisions of this
chapter, and in the event that any wages
earned under the contract shall not be paid
as required in this act, such person shall be
civilly liable for all wages for work
performed under such contract in the same
manner as if the employees entitled to such
wages were directly employed by such person."
The presence of two separate statutes, both governing
the obligation of contracting parties to pay wages earned by
employees of one of the contracting parties, renders the
statutes in pari materia.

That is, both of the statutes

relate to the same subject matter and were enacted for the
same general purpose.

Once it is demonstrated that two

statutes are in fact in pari materia, the following "wellestablished rule of statutory construction"2 applies:

Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983).
11

"In terms of legislative intent, it is
assumed that whenever the legislature enacts
a provision it has in mind previous statutes
relating
to
the
same
subject
matter,
wherefore it is held that in the absence of
any express repeal or amendment therein, the
new provision was enacted in accord with the
legislative policy embodied in those prior
statutes, and they all should be construed
together.
Provisions in an act which are omitted
in another act relating to the same subject
matter will be applied in a proceeding under
the other act, when not inconsistent with its
purposes.
Prior statutes relating to the
same subject matter are to be compared with
the new provisions; and if possible by
reasonable construction, both are to be so
construed that effect is given to every
provision in all of them."
2A, Sutherland
Statutory Construction, § 51.02, at 290 (4th
Ed. 1983).
Application

of

that

rule of

statutory

construction

requires, therefore, that each of the statutes —

the Utah

Wage Payment Statute and the Utah Bonding Statute —

be

interpreted in the manner most likely to give full effect to
each.

Clearly,

that

can

be

accomplished

only

by

interpreting the Utah Wage Payment Statute as not applying
to situations in which laborers are conferring an economic
benefit on a landowner's property.

Those situations are

expressly contemplated, and their consequences specified, in
the Utah Bonding Statute.

By its terms, the Utah Bonding

Statute is demonstrably more specific in scope.

It makes

specific provision for the payment of laborers' wages by the

12

landowner whose property is benefited.

By contrast, the

Utah Wage Payment Statute prescribes the obligations imposed
on persons who use subcontractors to perform work which
would otherwise be performed by such persons.

It is clearly

more general in scope and must be construed as not applying
to situations explicitly set forth in a separate statutory
provision such as the Utah Bonding Statute.
Under

that

analysis,

the

District

Court

properly

concluded that where, as here, liability is sought to be
imposed

on a landowner

for payment of wages earned by

employees of the landowner's contractor, the specific Utah
Bonding

Statute

and

not

the more General

Wage

Payment

Statute applies.

C.

The District Court's Interpretation Of § 34-28-8 Of The
Utah Wage Payment Statute Avoids Disastrous And
Punitive Consequences Which Were Never Intended By The
Utah Legislature.
In seeking reversal of the Summary Judgment Order, the

Commission

urges

this

court

to

ignore

common

sense

limitations respecting the types of contracts to which the
Utah Wage Payment Statute applies.
The breadth of the Commission's interpretation is best
highlighted by the following hypothetical:

Upon discovering

that his lawn mower is inoperable, a homeowner takes the
lawn mower to Mower, Inc., to have the engine repaired.
13

After examining the lawn mower, the manager of Mower, Inc.
agrees to make the repairs for $50, and a work order is
prepared and signed by the homeowner.

Two days later, the

homeowner returns to Mower, Inc.f pays the sum of $50f and
returns home with his lawn mower.

The lawn mower works

perfectly

satisfied

and

transaction.

the

homeowner

is

with

the

Unfortunately, Mower, Inc. fails to pay its

mechanic his hourly wage.

After reviewing the work order,

the mechanic determines that he spent three hours repairing
the homeowner's lawn mower and files a wage claim against
the homeowner for the wages he should have been paid by
Mower, Inc. According to the Commission's interpretation of
the Utah Wage Payment Statute, the homeowner is liable to
pay the mechanic's wages.

Indeed, under the Commission's

unbridled interpretation of the Utah Wage Payment Statute,
the only way that the homeowner could be assured that he
would not be liable for Mower, Inc.'s employee's unpaid
wages would be for the homeowner to pay the employee's wages
directly.
The number of similar hypotheticals which reach the
same

result

is

infinite;

no attempt

to set

forth all

possible hypotheticals will be made in this brief.

Suffice

it to state that the interpretation of the Utah Wage Payment
Statute advanced by the Commission does nothing less than

14

make

any

person

who

enters

into

a

contract

for

the

performance of services an insurer of all wages earned as a
result of such contract• In light of the fact that a huge
percentage of
oriented

this State's economy consists of service-

industry,

the

devastating

consequences

of

the

Commission's interpretation of the Utah Wage Payment Statute
cannot be understated.
Clearly, under the former Utah Wage Payment Statute (§
34-10-9, Utah Code Ann.)/ or the interpretation given the
Kansas

Wage

Statute, the

hypothetical would

result

be different.

in

the

above-described

The homeowner

in the

hypothetical, like RDG in this case, was not attempting to
evade the liability imposed on him by the Utah Wage Payment
Statute or the workmen's compensation statutes by entering
into a contract for services to be performed.

Application

of the Utah Wage Payment Statute in such a situation is
indefensible:

To justify the Commission's interpretation of

the existing Utah Wage Payment Statute, one must imply that
the Utah legislature, by the 1941 amendment, truly intended
to expand the reach and breadth of the Utah Wage Payment
Statute by making all persons who enter into contracts an
insurer of wages earned as a result of such contract.
an implication is simply not justified.

Such

The 1941 amendment

did nothing more than condense and simplify the Utah Wage

15

Payment Statute by substituting the term "person" for the
term "employer" and eliminating the cumbersome definition of
the term "employer."
The effort to condense and simplify statutory sections
is frequently attempted by the Utah legislature without any
intent to radically change the meaning of the statute. In
Stanton Transp. Co. v. Davis, 341 P.2d 207 (Utah 1959), for
example, the plaintiff argued that the Utah legislature, by
compiling

several

mechanic's

lien

statutes

into

one

statutory section, intended to increase the scope of the
lien statute.

In rejecting this argument, the Utah Supreme

Court stated:
"The argument that the legislature in
adopting the 1933 compilation of the code
consolidating these lien statutes into one
section intended to effect a radical change
in the meaning of the whole statute would
dignify the action of the legislature beyond
what actually happened. If a departure from
the traditional coverage of the lien laws is
to be effected it should be by a clear
manifestation of intent of the legislature
than is shown in the Tianner in which this
statute has come to its present form." Id.
at 210.
As was the case in Stanton, it cannot be said that the
legislature, by rewriting the Utah Wage Payment Statute to
eliminate the cumbersome definition contained in paragraph
(b) thereof, manifested an intent to expand radically the
scope of the statute.

16

Finallyf

it is clear that the compilers of the Utah

Code did not understand
enactment

of

the

applicability.
1941,

was

Utah

the 1941 Amendment or the 1966
wage

statute

to

expand

its

The Utah Wage Payment Statute, as amended in

entitled

subcontractor."

"Employer

liable

to

employees

of

This statutory heading was used despite the

fact that the 1941 amendment substituted the term "person"
for

the

term

"employer"

and

eliminated

the

cumbersome

definition of the term "employer" which was contained in
subparagraph

(b).

The 1966 enactment of the Utah Wage

Payment statute, merely reenacted § 34-10-9, Utah Code Ann.
into Chapter 28 of Title 34 with no change except for the
reference

to

"chapter"

compliance with act."

of

entitled

"Subcontractors

These headings clearly indicate that

the legislature did not
applicability

is

intend

to radically

the Utah Wage Payment

expand

Statute.

the
As a

consequence, there is little doubt that the Utah legislature
did not intend, by the 1941 amendment, to enlarge the scope
of the Utah Wage Payment Statute.
The Utah Wage Payment Statute is specifically designed
to prevent persons from evading statutory employer liability
by simply contracting away work which would otherwise have
been performed

by such person's direct

17

employees.

The

District Court's perceptive recognition of that purpose is
reflected in the Summary Judgment Order.

D.

The Principle Of Applying The "Plain Meaning11 Of A
Statute Is Not Violated By The District Court's Summary
Judgment Order.
In its brief, the Commission accurately observes that

the best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the
Legislature

in

language . . . "

enacting

[legislation]

is

the

plain

(Appellant's Brief, p. 6). However, it is

equally clear that this court has, on several occasions,
interpreted a broad and seemingly unambiguous statute to
give it "true meaning".
390 P.2d

915

(1964),

In Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254,
the court

interpreted

the tolling

provision contained in § 78-12-35, Utah Code Ann. (1953),
which provided that:
"If when a cause of action accrues
against a person when he is out of the state,
the action may be commenced within the term
herein limited after his return to the state,
and if after a cause of action accrues he
departs from the state, the time of his
absence is not part of the time limited for
the commencement of the action." (Emphasis
added).
In that case, the record established that plaintiff had
commenced her lawsuit four years and three days after her
accident.

In an effort to avoid the statute of limitations,

plaintiff

contended

that because
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defendants

returned

to

their

home

state

of

California

immediately

after

the

accident, the statute of limitations was tolled for the
duration of their absence from Utah.

In rejecting that

contention, the court observed that:
"It is to be conceded that upon a
superficial look at the above section,
ignoring
all other
considerations, its
literal wording might seem to indicate that
where a defendant departs from the state
after a cause of action arises, the time of
his absence should not be counted as part of
the time of the limitation. But statutes of
necessity must state their objectives in
general language. It is not always possible
to foresee and prescribe in precise detail
for all situations to which they might apply.
Attempts to give them universal and literal
application frequently lead to incongruous
results which were never intended. When it
is obvious that this is so, the statute
should not be so applied. In order to give a
statute its true meaning and significance it
should be considered in the light of its
background and the purpose sought to be
accomplished, together with other aspects of
the law which have a bearing on the problem
involved." Id. at 915-16. (Emphasis added).
In declining to interpret the statute literally without
reference to its underlying purpose and the existence of
other relevant legislation, the court held that because a
later

statute

authorized

service

upon

a

non-resident

motorist by serving the Secretary of State, the defendant's
physical departure from the state did not constitute an
"absence" from the state within the meaning of the tolling
statute.

Accordingly, the court found the action to be time
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barred even though the defendant had in fact departed from
the state.

The same principles of statutory construction

were endorsed and applied in Howell v. Jackson, 18 Utah 2d
269, 421 P.2d 159 (1966)•
Similarly, in the case at bar, the apparently expansive
terms of the Utah Wage Payment Statute are arguably so broad
as to regulate RDG's liability for payment of wages earned
by its contractor's employees.

However, application of the

statute in the manner the Commission seeks would clearly
lead to bizarre and "incongruous" results. Only by limiting
the

application

of

the

Utah

Wage

Payment

Statute

to

situations in which a contracting party is contracting or
delegating a portion of its work to purported independent
contractors

for

the

purpose

of

circumventing

wage

obligations does the Utah Wage Payment Statute make any
sense.
Previous pronouncements of this court support RDG's
position that the Utah Wage Payment Statute like any other
legislation,

must

be

interpreted

in

a

consistent with actual legislative intent.
Company v.

sensible

manner

American Coal

Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984) ("This

court's primary responsibility in construing legislation is
to give effect to the intent of the legislature."); Stahl v.
Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480 (Utah L980) ("It
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is

also our duty to construe a statutory provision so as to
make it harmonious with other

statutes

relevant

to the

subject matter."); United States Smelting, Refining & Mining
Company v. Nielsen, 20 Utah 2d 271, 437 P.2d 199, 201 ("But
it is true here, as it is practically everywhere in the law,
that all of the law is not stated and cannot be stated in
one provision*

These [workmen's compensation] statutes must

be looked at together, in the light of established rules of
statutory

construction, with a view

to

reconciling

any

apparent conflict and giving each of them effect according
to their purpose insofar as that can be accomplished.");
Colman v. Utah State Land Board, Utah 2d 14, 403 P.2d 781,
783 ("The statutes we have referred to should be considered
together

and

in

connection

harmonized insofar as possible
Moreover,

it

is

a

with

the

entire

act

and

. . . . " ) .

well-established

principle

of

statutory construction that penal statutes which seek to
impose statutory penalties of the type at issue in this case
must

be

strictly

construed.

2A,

Construction, § 59.03 (4th Ed. 1973).

Sutherland

Statutory

That principle has

been clearly expressed as follows:
"It is a well-established principle of
statutory construction that penal statutes
must be strictly construed in determining the
liability of the person upon whom the penalty
is imposed, and that the more severe the
penalty, and
the more disastrous
the
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consequence to the person subjected to the
provision of the statutef the more rigid will
be the construction of its provisions in
favor of such person and against the
enforcement of such law," Missouri K. & T.R.
Co. v. State, 100 Texas 420, 100 S.W. 766,
767 (1907).
Clearly, in this case, it is difficult to conceive of a
penalty more devastating to a landowner than being required
to pay its contractor's employees after once paying the
contractor.

Making a landowner responsible for all such

wages renders it a statutory guarantor of full payment.

As

a penal provision, the Utah Wage Payment Statute must be
both strictly and sensibly construed.

The Summary Judgment

Order appropriately reflects that construction.
CONCLUSION
There are at least five separate bases on which the
District Court properly premised its decision not to apply
the Utah Wage Payment Statute in the manner urged by the
Commission.

First,

versions

the

of

the

Utah

evolution
Wage

of

Payment

the

predecessor

Statute

and

the

application of an almost identical statute by the Kansas
Supreme

Court

strongly

suggests

that

the

legislature

intended only to impose liability on contracting parties for
the payment of wages earned by employees of subcontractors
who performed work that would otherwise have been performed
by the contracting parties.

As such, the Utah Wage Payment
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Statute cannot be viewed as making contracting parties,
under all conceivable circumstances, absolute guarantors of
wage

obligations.

Second,

the

Utah

Bonding

Statute

expressly addresses the issue of a landowner's liability for
the

payment

of

wages

earned

in

connection

improvement of a landowner's property.

with

That is the only

statute that even arguably applies in this case.
literal
leads

the

Third,

interpretation of the Utah Wage Payment Statute
to

devastating

legislature.

results

never

intended

by

the

Fourth, the "plain meaning" of the Utah Wage

Payment Statute is not violated by the imposition of common
sense limitations on legislation which, of necessity, is
general in scope.

Finally, as a penal statute, the Utah

Wage Payment Statute must be strictly construed.
The District Court correctly applied these principles
in entering the Summary Judgment Order.

It is respectfully

submitted that this court should affirm that determination.
DATED this

/(?

day of June, 1986.
HANSEN & ANDERSON

By LS/\A^fi/

v / (2n//Ad^hJ

/Jofan T. Anderson
A t t o r n e y s for Respondent
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